IIt’s the moment that may come to be seen as the beginning of his chancellorship. Friedrich Merz is just leaving an event held by the German Startup Association on Wednesday, November 6, when a news item comes over the car radio. And it changes everything. Germany’s government has collapsed, the three-party coalition led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz is history. Such is the account Merz, the leader of Germany’s center-right Christian Democrats (CDU), would later relate to a small group.

Merz has his driver take him to his office, where he meets with Alexander Dobrindt, who is group leader for the Christian Social Union (CSU), the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, in German parliament. Additional senior conservatives join them, including CDU General Secretary Carsten Linnemann and top CDU and CSU parliamentarians. Bavarian governor and CSU chairman Marcus Söder also joins the group over video call. Water, chocolate and nuts are served as the group gathers around the television to watch Scholz accuse Finance Minister Christian Lindner, who he has just fired, of "egotism” and of engaging in "petty party tactics.” Merz and Dobrindt, both of whom are close to Lindner, find the accusation to be below the belt.

Together, they draft a statement, keeping it as short as possible: "A confidence vote must be held as quickly as possible. A government vacuum is not an option for Germany. We are ready for quick new elections.”

For the moment, that is all they have to say, and the group goes their separate ways before midnight. Merz heads home to his apartment in Berlin knowing that he is closer than ever before to his loftiest goal. That by the time spring arrives, he might finally be the chancellor of Germany.

Rarely in German history has the situation at the beginning of a campaign been as clear as it is right now. The CDU and CSU (together known as the Union) are far ahead of the other parties, twice as strong as Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD). Indeed, Scholz is so unpopular that hardly anyone in his own party has much confidence in his ability to make up the deficit in the three months before the snap election, which has been set for February 23. It seems almost as though it has already been decided.

Campaigns, of course, don’t usually go as predicted. The SPD could decide to ditch Scholz in favor of Boris Pistorius, the current defense minister who is far more popular. And Merz could easily produce one or two of the gaffes he has become famous for and turn off a few voters. Still, it seems quite likely that 69-year-old Joachim-Friedrich Martin Josef Merz, from the town of Brilon, just east of Dortmund, will become the 10th chancellor of the postwar German republic.

Should he find success, he will inherit a deeply insecure country in which the political fringes, especially the right, are stronger than ever – a situation that has produced a strange mixture of irritability and despondency. The next chancellor must finally convince German voters that the country needs to do much more – spend far more – for their own defense. He or she must reestablish positive relationships with Germany’s most important partners in Europe, France above all. Irregular migration must be brought under control while at the same time making the country more attractive to foreign experts. The next chancellor will have to fix the country’s aging infrastructure, prepare the welfare state for the future, ensure energy supply, strengthen Germany’s status as a place of doing business. And more. And all of those tasks must be tackled in a world where authoritarian systems are expanding their power and liberal democracy is on the defensive.

What does Merz plan to do should the Union win the election? What will he do differently than Scholz and his coalition? The fact that the next government must avoid becoming mired in bickering like this one has goes without saying.

What does Friedrich Merz’s plan for the country look like?

A New Era for Germany's Military

On a recent Wednesday evening at CDU headquarters in Berlin, the party was hosting a discussion on military conscription and Merz took advantage of the event to hold a policy speech on national security. Should he become chancellor, he said, he will tell the Germans bluntly that the "relative brief period of peace in Europe” following the fall of the Berlin Wall is now over. A strong German military is needed, he said.

Many German conservatives weren’t happy about the fact that it was the SPD, and the former conscientious objector Scholz, who set about rearming the Bundeswehr, Germany’s military, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That it was the SPD who injected 100 billion euros into the military to modernize the troops after years in which the country’s armed forced had been neglected – by defense ministers from the CDU and CSU.

Merz wants the CDU to again be the party of the military, and he has sought to establish close ties to the Bundeswehr. In June, he climbed into a Eurofighter for a photogenic flight during an exercise of the reserves. A few weeks ago, he visited a military base in Idar-Oberstein, where he was told by officers just how empty the army’s munition depots still are – more than two-and-a-half years after Chancellor Scholz announced a new era for the Bundeswehr. Merz, says one participant, was shocked.

During his visits with the troops, Merz frequently brings an insider along with him. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Andrä was once the commander of the Bundeswehr contingent in Lithuania and is now part of Merz’s team of advisors. Andrä is intimately familiar with the military’s acute needs and knows who is in the best position to give his boss an honest accounting of the true state of the Bundeswehr.

Merz has received Colonel André Wüstner, the chairman of the Bundeswehr Association, in his office on several occasions. Should Merz become chancellor, says Wüstner, he faces a monumental task. "Merz must quickly resuscitate the reform of the German military, which came to a virtual standstill because of the bickering” inside of Scholz’s coalition, he says. A "turbo start” is necessary for all aspects of the fighting force: materiel, personnel and infrastructure. That is particularly true now that Donald Trump has been elected president of the U.S., a man who is sure to demand higher defense spending from his European allies, particularly the Germans.

But what about the 100 billion euros that Scholz poured into the Bundeswehr? It will have been used up by the end of 2027. After that, the defense budget will need to be boosted by at least 30 billion euros, and likely closer to 40 billion euros per year, to meet the NATO prescribed goal that member states spend the equivalent of at least 2 percent of GDP on defense.

Merz recently realized that the 2-percent target might just be the tip of the iceberg, having read in the newspaper that the new NATO defense plans will result in significant demands for more weapons systems and personnel from Germany. In early October, he met with the Bundeswehr’s senior-most officer, Inspector General Carsten Breuer, to gain a better understanding of how significant the demands might be. The answer: vast.

Merz’s team is considering the possibility of another special military fund. But instead of another 100 billion euros, the group is focusing on a number closer to 300 billion.

And what about Ukraine? Should Merz become chancellor, he would continue to support Kyiv in its fight against Russia and would likely allow the Ukrainian military to fire at targets deep inside Russian territory. In contrast to Scholz, he could even supply Ukraine with Taurus cruise missiles for the purpose, assuming it’s not too late.

Expensive Tax Plans

Politicians frequently speak of conflicting goals, and Merz, should German voters send him to the Chancellery, would face a significant conflict early on. Thus far, the CDU chairman has been a fervent defender of the debt brake, as the German balanced-budget amendment is called. As Merz surely knows, however, an increase to the defense budget of the kind he is contemplating would be virtually impossible without taking on new debt.

And he has plenty of other costly plans as well. Merz has announced his intention to cut taxes for German businesses and citizens alike. He has long been a critic of the significant tax burden in the country, with companies here having to fork over a greater share of their profits to the state than in almost any other industrialized country. And even skilled workers frequently find themselves in the top tax bracket, provided they are not married.

In particular, Merz intends to take aim at the so-called middle-class bulge in the country’s tax rate. The problem, though, is that doing so could tear a hole – of around 30 billion euros per year – in the state’s tax revenues. And simply shifting tax brackets upward could prove even more costly.

It is, in fact, one of the greatest dilemmas Merz might face as German chancellor: Either he cuts taxes for companies and workers – which would require him to bid adieu to the debt brake. Or he remains loyal to the debt brake – and would be unable to lower taxes.

Are there potential alternatives? Merz could cut spending elsewhere or, for example, raise VAT. Both would be likely to trigger protests, something Merz would, no doubt, like to avoid. Making a reform of the debt-brake law a necessity. Indeed, Merz indicated for the first time last week a willingness to consider the proposition.

The debt brake, however, is anchored in the German constitution and changing it would require a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament. Even if the Union and the SPD teamed up for yet another Grand Coalition government, current polls suggest that they would not have enough seats to push through such a reform. Merz would have to find other partners. The Free Democrats (FDP), the party of Christian Lindner, who Scholz just fired as finance minister in part because of his commitment to the debt brake, isn’t likely. Indeed, the FDP would likely be able to block such a reform in parliament with the left-wing party Bund Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD).

Welfare Reform

When senior CDU politicians start talking about the most pressing issues that a conservative government would tackle, it doesn’t take long before welfare reform is mentioned. Motto: "Those able to work must work.” If they don’t, they don’t get any money from the state. Merz considers such a reform to potentially be the largest he might tackle as chancellor.

How big would such a reform be? Merz argues that 1.7 million people in Germany are currently receiving welfare payments from the current system (called "Bürgergeld”) despite being able to work. CDU General Secretary Linnemann believes the number of people who completely refuse to work is "in the six figures” – people whose welfare payments would be completely eliminated. Which would result in significant savings: According to Linnemann, they could amount to 10 billion of the 50 billion in welfare payments disbursed by the state this year.

Many workers might welcome such a reform, but it’s not quite that easy. The Constitutional Court, Germany’s highest court, handed down a ruling in 2019 that strictly limited the sanctions that could be applied to those who refuse to work. "The minimum subsistence level may only be cut if strict standards are observed,” says Frankfurt-based social law expert Andrea Kießling. It is unconstitutional, for example, to use welfare cuts punitively.

The CDU has pledged to completely cut off payments to those who are unwilling to work. High court judges have allowed an exception on this point – but the provision has already been written into law – by Scholz’s coalition. The conditions are so specific, however, that the situation almost never comes up in practice. "My assessment is that it is impossible to find a practicable regulation for a complete elimination of payments that does not also affect the wrong people – and that is prohibited by the constitution,” says Kießling. She also believes that the CDU’s plan to cut off welfare payments after just the second missed appointment at the job office is unconstitutional.

The fundamental question is really: What would be the benefits of such a strict law? "Tightening the thumbscrews would hardly reduce the number of unemployed people receiving welfare payments,” says Martin Brussig, a Duisburg-based sociologist who specializes in the labor market. The vast majority of the unemployed are not suffering first and foremost from a lack of desire, rather they have serious shortcomings – such as a lack of language knowledge or other qualifications – or they have health issues such as addictions, mental illness or chronic physical ailments.

A rather different impression has taken hold among the German public, where the Bürgergeld system has become synonymous with state-funded laziness. It is a problem that the SPD has also recognized, particularly with the project having triggered significant dissatisfaction among the party’s core voters: blue-collar workers. Last summer, Scholz’s coalition agreed to tighten up the rules in accordance with the leeway allowed by the constitution. But the rules were not implemented prior to the collapse of the coalition. It seems likely, then, that Merz’s much touted far-reaching welfare reform will largely consist of changing the name of the system from Bürgergeld to something else.

The Border

Those who spend a lot of time with Friedrich Merz have recently noticed a change. He no longer talks about Angela Merkel as much. It used to be the case, they say, that in almost every discussion he would begin venting his frustration and anger with his long-time adversary at some point. Merkel fired him as CDU parliamentary group leader way back in 2002, and Merz never forgave her. Recently, though, it appears he has managed to put it behind him.

Nevertheless, he continues to view some of Merkel’s policies as misguided, and he is particularly critical of her decision to welcome so many migrants to the country in 2015 as the refugee crisis took hold of Europe. Merz intends to reduce irregular migration, if not eliminate it entirely. It is a project that will likely find widespread support in the country, with numerous municipalities complaining of being overwhelmed by the more than 1 million Ukrainians who have come to the country since 2022, in addition to hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers from elsewhere. And because the Dublin Regulation, meant to fairly distribute asylum seekers throughout the European Union, doesn’t work.

The issue will be a primary focus of his campaign. Which means that should he be elected, he will be measured by the progress he makes. And whether he can maintain humanity while doing so.

In recent months, Merz has bombarded Chancellor Scholz with a steady slew of demands. Most recently, he called for a de facto ban on the admission of asylum seekers from Syria and Afghanistan. Merz has appealed for a the "comprehensive” rejection of asylum seekers right at the border, believing that doing so could send a message that would lead to a reduction of irregular migration. Many in the CDU believe that Merkel’s welcoming stance to refugees back in 2015, the selfies she took with newcomers, created a pull that led many others to leave their homes for Germany. Merz hopes that his new toughness would be enough to dissuade would-be migrants from making the journey.

Conservative parliamentarians have introduced a motion to this effect in the Bundestag, arguing that migration has become a risk to domestic security. The country’s reception capacities have been exhausted, they say, and because Germany is now facing an exceptional burden, it can invoke a clause in the EU treaties designed for just such an eventuality. Doing so would then enable the country to turn back asylum seekers.

Such a move, though, is not without legal controversy and could end up before the European Court of Justice. Furthermore, it is unclear whether a policy of the kind Merz envisions would lead to success. Asylum seekers may just leave the roads and come in across the fields and through the forests. And Merz would find himself in conflict with his European neighbors.

Huffing and Puffing against Wind Power

Recently, Friedrich Merz triggered yet another debate with a single sentence uttered on a popular German talk show. "I even believe that if we do things right, we will be able to take down the wind turbines one day, because they are ugly and don’t fit into the landscape.”

He was immediately criticized. But the real question is: Will Merz – before this "one day” ultimately comes – continue to expand wind power? He probably will, for lack of alternatives. If Germany is to keep to its climate goals – which the Union supports, in contrast to FDP chairman Lindner – there really is no alternative.

The CDU and CSU have been extremely critical of the energy policy pursued by the Scholz government, but it seems unlikely that they would do all that much differently. In an energy concept that deputy floor leader Jens Spahn was involved in, the return to nuclear power is discussed, as is nuclear fusion. But even Spahn now says he is fully aware that fusion is not a solution for the present. Thus far, it only exists as an idea.

And nuclear power? At least a decade would pass before any new nuclear power plants would be up and running in Germany, assuming anybody could be found to operate them. Markus Krebber, head of the German energy giant RWE, recently explained in detail at a Union event how complicated it would be to revitalize Germany’s mothballed nuclear reactors.

Like the Scholz government, the Union also sees Germany’s energy needs being met by a combination of wind, solar, smart grids, storage, biogas, green gases and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). The differences lie primarily in the details and in which technology is given the most weight.

Merz himself is not known for tilting at environmental windmills, but he also hasn’t shown a particular passion for climate and species protection. Fellow CDU members say its not where his interests lie.

Baby? Bathwater?

Would the country be completely different if Merz came to power? There is little to indicate such a thing. It looks more like he would only slightly adjust the direction embarked on by Olaf Scholz in a few areas – and that he would try to improve the efficiency of government in others, an efficiency that was lacking in Scholz’s coalition.

Merz and his people have, however, pledged to throw out a few of the projects passed by the Scholz administration – beyond just the Bürgergeld. High on the list is Germany’s recent legalization of cannabis and of dual citizenship. Not to mention the controversial heating law.