Interview: "We Opposed War in Iraq for Good Reasons" - DER SPIEGEL
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Interview "We Opposed War in Iraq for Good Reasons"

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer discusses the possible deployment of German troops in Iraq, unclear weapons export guidelines, and Turkey's proposed acceptance into the EU.
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SPIEGEL:

Mr. Minister, members of the red-green coalition have voiced their astonishment at statements made by your fellow cabinet member, Peter Struck, who has said that he can only rule out Germany's sending troops to Iraq "for now, but not forever." What prompted him to say this?

Fischer: I think Peter Struck has since made it clear that his comments did not justify the flurry of headlines they generated. The federal government has not changed its position: There are no German troops in Iraq now, and there will be no German troops in Iraq in the future.

SPIEGEL: The Chancellor has made similar statements, but has nevertheless been unable to stop his defense minister from issuing these kinds of statements about now and forever.

Fischer: These issues are beyond the scope of the federal government; they are the business of churches and religious communities. The big problem, as I see it, is that our options in Iraq are being reduced.

I do not consider simply exchanging Western troops in Iraq to be a constructive option! In my view, that is simply thinking in the wrong direction.

SPIEGEL: Does this strict rejection on the issue of troop deployment also apply if there is a change in the US administration? The Democratic candidate, John Kerry, has already announced that he intends to return to multilateral approaches to resolving conflicts.

Fischer: I will not speculate on a potential new political majority situation in the United States. My comments relate exclusively to what is necessary in Iraq.

After all, we opposed the war in Iraq for good reasons. And now the debate surrounding the original justification for the war has only confirmed our skepticism. My position, and that of the federal government, remains unchanged in this regard.

SPIEGEL: Then let us turn to the matter of Turkey. You seem to have been won over by the progress the Turks have made on the subject of reform. The country has only recently been deemed ready for negotiations to join the EU, and yet it is already being treated as a suitable candidate for shipments of German combat tanks.

Fischer: There have been no requests in this regard. Incidentally, we have clear standards, under which weapons cooperation with EU and NATO partners is generally considered acceptable. In Turkey, the realities in the southeastern portion of the country, as well as the human rights situation, have prompted us to adapt a cautious approach. If these realities change, however, our position will have to be reevaluated to reflect such changes.

SPIEGEL: How will you respond if the reform process begins to stagnate again? Would you ask them to return the tanks?

Fischer: There is no request on the table, nor is the reform process stagnating. So why speculate?

SPIEGEL: That's not a very satisfactory response. Perhaps you could also explain why we are supplying Iraq with the "Fuchs" armored transport vehicle. After all, we decided not to sell the Israelis the same equipment, to prevent it from being used against Palestinian civilians.

Fischer: That's not a fair comparison. In Iraq, we have an interest in seeing the political process succeed. This includes the development of Iraqi security structures. Our contribution to this effort does not consist solely in providing training outside Iraq, but also in supplying them with the "Fuchs" transport vehicles. This is necessary to keep the country together.

SPIEGEL: Is exporting weapons to all kinds of countries a consequence of the end of the German post-war period proclaimed by the chancellor?

Fischer: Why the polemics? As far as requests are concerned, we examine each individual case carefully and strictly on the basis of the political principles of our weapons export guidelines and the EU code of conduct. In this process, we arrive at both positive and negative decisions, but I am not in a position to discuss individual cases with you.

SPIEGEL: Well, there are some differences of opinion, with respect to China, for example. The chancellor would like to lift the restrictions, while his deputy remains reticent on the matter.

Fischer: There are currently no indications of consensus within the European Union on this issue. Some especially critical issues include Beijing's willingness to settle its dispute with Taiwan peacefully, as well as to improve its human rights situation. We do see progress, but also some deficits. I addressed this quite openly during my visit to Beijing...

SPIEGEL: ... while keeping one eye focused on German economic interests?

Fischer: The two things are not mutually exclusive. An issue, by the way, that I find very disconcerting is that the United States, our most important ally outside Europe and fast becoming an important partner to China, is increasingly structuring its relationships in the form of rivalries. Yet another reason for the EU to make headway with export guidelines. We are completely committed to this issue.

SPIEGEL: Despite the risk that this will certainly result in violation of our previous guidelines on exporting weapons?

Fischer: No, on the contrary. This will not affect our restrictive national export guidelines in the least.

SPIEGEL: Doesn't the foreign minister find it disturbing that Gerhard Schröder is increasingly being accused of cultivating an inappropriately close relationship with President Vladimir Putin?

Fischer: You are being unfair to the chancellor. It is a great mistake to assume that he is keeping a low profile when discussing the issue of Chechnya with Putin, which you are clearly implying. He is simply attempting to move things forward on the basis of trust, instead of relying on demonstrative action. I believe that he deserves our full support in this respect.

SPIEGEL: The head of your party, Reinhard Bütikofer, has a completely different opinion.

Fischer: I have never discussed the issue with him. He may have different priorities, but that certainly does not justify this digging for signs of dissent.

SPIEGEL: Mr. Bütikofer gave it to you and everyone else in writing, so to speak, in an open letter:

In his view, the West's policies toward Russia have failed.

Fischer: I have taken a close look at the letter and have been unable to find any mention of an alternative.

SPIEGEL: Spoken like a true champion of realpolitik. But even champions make mistakes. Nowadays, you are one of Turkey's strongest supporters. But just three years ago, you showed up in Brussels and did your best, behind the scenes, that is, to make sure that the negotiations surrounding Turkey's application for EU membership would fail on a procedural basis.

Fischer: You certainly must be suffering from hallucinations.

SPIEGEL: You weren't against it?

Fischer: Admittedly, I was 51 percent in favor and 49 percent against Turkey's joining the EU. Back then, before Sept. 11, I felt differently than I do today about the issue of Turkey's borders with Iraq, Iran and Syria. After the terrible events in the United States, it became clear where European security will be defined in the future. It'll be the Near East and the Middle East, a region in which, in my view, Iran's nuclear program and the development of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are as much a cause for concern as the situation in Iraq. Add to that the factor of terrorism.

SPIEGEL: And you now believe that EU membership for Turkey could help control this pandemonium?

Fischer: In terms of its policy toward Turkey, this administration has maintained continuity with all of its precursor administrations, from Adenauer to Kohl. Speaking of Turkey, I remember a promise that was given to Ankara more than 40 years ago. Why has the West, Konrad Adenauer's administration, and in fact all German administrations since then held fast to his promise? Should I tell you? The reasons lie in strategic interests during the Cold War.

In the post-Cold War period, these interests have not disappeared. In fact, they have become even more pronounced.

SPIEGEL: The fate of Europe -- and perhaps the rest of the word -- will be decided on the Bosporus?

Fischer: No. Please stop exaggerating. I'm talking about something else. The key issue will be whether we can successfully reconcile a large Muslim country with the concepts of a market economy, fundamental western principles of enlightenment, human rights and democracy, in short, with a strong civil society. I believe that even those who are against launching the negotiations for EU membership share this basic assumption.

SPIEGEL: And such hopes cannot be realized with anything but Turkey's full integration into the EU?

Fischer: If we were being dealt a completely new hand today, I would have more understanding for one argument or the other. Nowadays, however, any other solution, including the privileged partnership proposed by the CDU, amounts to nothing but a bureaucratic rejection.

SPIEGEL: In many of your statements about the EU, you have consistently talked about political union. Instead, we have now arrived at a partnership based on security concerns, a completely different approach.

Fischer: Not in the least. After all, I do not rule out political union.

SPIEGEL: Isn't it true, though, that you have long since abandoned your original idea that Europe, following the inclusion of the eastern European countries, will become a counterweight to the American and Asian spheres of influence? Instead, the key issues nowadays are of a geo-strategic nature. The first illusion is now being followed by the second one -- that is, the idea of surrounding half the orient in the interest of security.

Fischer: Who is accusing me of that?

SPIEGEL: The historian Heinrich August Winkler.

Fischer: I have a lot of respect for Mr. Winkler - but not as a politician. In the meantime, we have been thrown into a situation that no one, not even Mr. Winkler and SPIEGEL, can ignore. Anything but a pledge to begin negotiations with Turkey will be interpreted as a rejection in Ankara. That's a simple fact.

SPIEGEL: So you are saying that something like automatic accession does exist?

Fischer: No. A decision will be reached in the end. That probably means in about 10 to 15 years, and Turkey is aware of this. It is an open process, as far as procedures and final assessment are concerned. What is not open, however, is the objective, that is, accession to the EU. This objective is the subject of negotiations. There is another relevant question, although it is one that I can answer in the affirmative: When the time comes, will the EU be able to cope with such a large country joining its ranks? Whether the Mediterranean region -- which adjoins the Near East -- is to become a region of cooperation or confrontation is the decisive issue for us, an issue that is just as important today as that of West Berlin's security was during the Cold War.

SPIEGEL: We would like a more specific answer: May the EU say no or not?

Fischer: That depends on the results. This is the way it's stated in the recommendations. Incidentally, my take on this is as follows: ultimately, the answer will be yes.

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan