SPIEGEL: Is the once so feared Israeli Army losing its magic touch?

Eiland: This is not a normal war. It is a war between a state, Israel, and an organization, the Hezbollah. In such asymetric conflicts there is a natural gap between the expectations of politicians, journalists and citizens on the one hand, and the capabilities of the army on the other. There are four expectations: the operation will be short, the number of casualties low, there will be only few innocent victims on the other side and we can reach a decisive victory. This gap is a result of the use of the wrong terms and the wrong parameters. And this is not only an Israeli phenomenon: A few months ago, American President George W. Bush mentioned the growing number of Iraqi battallions ready to operate in order to prove that the situation in Iraq is becoming more stable. The number of battallions may have been important during World War II, but in an asymetric war it is less relevant.

SPIEGEL: Was the Israeli Army ill-prepared for war against Hezbollah?

Eiland: During the past six years, we didn't deal sufficiently with this kind of war. Certain capabilities were neglected. If a brigade commander leads a big military operation for the first time without ever having gone through a military exercise, during which he had to coordinate this amount of artillery, war planes and attack helicopters, one pays a certain price for that lack of experience. We had to draw our attention to many fronts, but the Hezbollah by contrast has only planned this single war. Fortunately, the Israeli Army knows how to learn new lessons quickly. And I hope that we will see results soon.

SPIEGEL: Even before the Lebanese crisis, the army was already experiencing problems on the Palestinian front. A soldier was kidnapped by Palestinian militants. The conclusion drawn by an inquiry commission which you led was that the kidnapping could have been avoided.

Eiland: Many mistakes were made. To name just one example: The terrorists dug a tunnel under the border and came out behind the Israeli watchtower. One soldier had been ordered to observe the area behind the watchtower. She did not do this. This enabled the terrorists to dig an exit without being noticed and attack. Other mistakes were made at higher levels of the command chain, too. Our intelligence services have long warned about the threat of an attack by Palestinian terrorists through a tunnel. In order to avoid detection, the entrance to such a tunnel always lies inside the basement of a house, as close as possible to the border. In this case there were six or seven houses in question. The army could have conducted a raid, but since last September's withdrawal we have been too respectful of the "sovereignty" of the Gaza Strip.

SPIEGEL: Could this war have been prevented?

Eiland: Probably, yes. Israel had several options. In the past years, we practiced a policy of containment. We showed restraint, even when Hezbollah provoked us from time to time. The second choice would have been to do what we are currently doing in Lebanon, but to have done so two or four years ago. And there were plenty of similar events like the kidnapping two weeks ago that could have provided the opportunity. The advantage would have been that Hezbollah was weaker four years ago. If we only had these two options, I favored the policy of containment. As far as I remember no one in the security establishmet questioned it.

SPIEGEL: But that only served to postpone problems with Hezbollah.

Eiland: I suggested a third way one and a half years ago. Because of the withdrawal of Syria, there was a unique opportunity to change the situation in Lebanon fundamentally. For the first time there was a kind of national movement in the country, which had previously been divided. Due to the problems in Iraq, the United States government was very interested in being able to present achievements in an Arab country like Lebanon. France was also prepared to do more to rebuild the country. But most important was the realization by influential Arab countries like Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia that they were being threatened by Iran. This meant that they were much more prepared to do something to stop Hezbollah, which is an Iranian proxy organization.

SPIEGEL: What was your plan?

Eiland: I suggested a package deal which was to be presented by the international community -- by the Middle East quartet, for example. I had good reason to believe that the United States, United Nations and France would support it. We could not merely demand the implementation of UN resolution 1559 and the disarmament of the Hezbollah. In order to get the of the Lebanese government, Israel also had to make concessions -- like the release of Lebanese prisoners -- to stop the flights into Lebanese airspace and to agree to a redemarcation of the border between Israel and Lebanon.