How does one alleviate tense relations between two states? Lena Hassinger-Less, an interpreter working for the Chancellor, knows how it works now. She is a stylish and lively woman, which is partly evident in the way she uses all kinds of hand gestures to underscore her speech.

And this is how it happened: Just as German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and US President George W. Bush began their 40-minute conversation last Wednesday at New York's Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, Ms. Hassinger-Less' pen managed to escape from her grasp, catapult through the air, and land in the host's lap. It was an incident that could be neither ignored nor brushed aside with a smile. But the world's most powerful man defused this mildly embarrassing situation with a refreshing comeback: "This is an attack with weapons of mass destruction." A member of Schröder's staff later remarked on how pleased he had been about Bush' remark: "That was the ice-breaker."

At that point, the most important objective of the meeting with Bush already seemed to have been achieved: The Chancellor wanted to reestablish a basis for discussion, something the German government and its most powerful ally, following their heated dispute surrounding the Iraq policy, had lacked for a sixteen-month period.

The prevailing opinion at the White House was that it's about time, and Schröder also felt that it was time to break the silence. He likes to say that nations do not pursue romantic relationships, and in this respect his sentiments echo the words of Otto von Bismarck, former Chancellor of the German Reich, who once wrote in his memoirs that "not even the king" has the right to subordinate the interests of the state to his personal sympathies or antipathies.

In suite 35 H at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, where the Washington administration has leased an entire floor for 50 years, a lively Bush greeted the German Chancellor with the words "Gerhard, we should let the past lie and look to the future."

The guest from Berlin nodded. The two men, visibly relieved, sat down on mustard-yellow chairs, facing a bouquet of yellow roses. Both men were surrounded by their key combatants: the US President by the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, Bush' chief of staff, and a secretary, and Schröder by coalition partner Joschka Fischer, his foreign policy advisor, and the German ambassador.

Following the overture from the master of the house, it was up to the Chancellor to continue this offensive of friendliness. Speaking in German and using the familiar "Du," Schröder went straight to the point with the great George: "I really shouldn't be here." All hell was breaking loose at home in Germany, he said, as his administration is in the process of trying to push a number of very important social reforms through parliament. "I understand, Gerd," replied the US president, already sounding quite friendly.

The German, clearly encouraged by the president's affable approach, told the American about the secrets of "Agenda 2010," even mentioning the most significant cosmetic defect in his domestic policy: "George, you know, of course, that I only have a four-vote majority."

The US president was clearly surprised, and in two respects. First, it appeared that he was in fact unaware of just how little latitude the Chancellor has and, second, he had not expected such a disarming display of openness on the part of his guest.

The mood became perceptibly more amiable. After all, as National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice had communicated to the Berlin delegation beforehand, Bush had gone into the meeting with considerable apprehension.

He had not ruled out renewed provocation or at least continued inflexibility, and had ordered the necessary precautions taken: no photographers! Not even the internationally accepted gesture - the handshake - was to be delivered to the global public.

After all, the meeting was poised to begin on a less than positive note. In an earlier meeting, French President Jacques Chirac had given his US colleague an affected lecture on war, peace and international law. According to American sources, George Bush was "pissed off," and became all the more so when Chirac railed against a "policy of fait accompli" in his speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In contrast, Schröder displayed his more charming side. There were no lectures. More importantly, there wasn't a hint of triumph, which, given the situation in an Iraq embroiled in conflict, would have been both justified and ill-advised. The Chancellor saved his call for "multilateralism" and UN involvement in Iraq - which, in his view, is the only approach that can "guarantee legitimacy" - for his speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The same message sounded far more cautious when delivered personally to Bush. Germany, said Schröder, intends to provide constructive assistance in rebuilding Iraq and help train police officers and soldiers. And weren't the two men of the same mind when it came to the goal of transferring sovereignty to an Iraqi government? The American commander-in-chief nodded, clearly understanding the difference between Schröder's proposals and the French demand for the quickest possible transfer of power in the Gulf.

Bush also made it clear to Schröder that although he is a powerful man, his hands are still somewhat tied. "The US Congress will not approve our request for 20 billion dollars for reconstruction if the money simply flows into the hands of some non-legitimate government."

Naturally, said Bush, sovereignty would have to be transferred from the United States to the Iraqis, but that would have to take its orderly and unhurried course. He said he was no dogmatist, especially since his fellow Americans aren't terribly interested in the struggles surrounding UN resolutions: "Most people in the US don't give a damn about a UN resolution." Loosely translated (into German), this means that most people couldn't care less about the wording of UN resolutions.

Perhaps, the Chancellor cleverly suggested, a gradual transfer of sovereignty could ease the situation. Bush played along with Schröder's remark by noticeably opening his eyes, which he had initially narrowed to small slits. He was clearly impressed by the Germans' eagerness to reach a compromise.

"A new idea" had been born, the President trilled, and suggested that the experts in drafting complex resolutions, "our two foreign ministers," be given the task of resolving this issue: "How do you feel about that, Gerd?"

Later on, the Chancellor was able to proudly announce that he and George had issued a "suitable assignment to the foreign ministers." He was clearly pleased with his words, since it so obviously delineates a division of power between master and underling. Schröder subsequently explained that his friend Joschka would be "absolutely and solely" responsible for "operational issues of foreign policy" or, in other words, the nitty-gritty.

Once they had relaxed, the heads of state were able to devote themselves to cultivating their relations, and to cautiously address their differences. One issue they discussed was Iran, whose nuclear program is particularly irksome to the United States. The Germans are suspicious of the fact that an aggressive stance is beginning to materialize - once again - in the United States. Schröder, who would like to avoid yet another global confrontation, asked the President why the Americans are unwilling to allow the Teheran government to sign a declaration affirming its agreement not to process weapons-grade uranium, so that it would not be completely prohibited from using nuclear energy for civilian purposes.

Bush voiced his disagreement with Schröder's suggestion, but gently. He too worded his position in the form of a question, taking pains to avoid upsetting the German-American rapprochement. According to Bush, the Iranians have plenty of oil, "so why would they need nuclear energy?" It was a direct pass to Vice Chancellor Fischer, the German Green Party's top politician, who then commented "I can only support you in this regard, Mr. President," adding that this his position was rather environmentally correct.

Bush smiled thinly. It was a role he didn't seem particularly keen to assume, and he corrected the energetic foreign minister: "A country as big as the United States can't just rely on wind power." The Chancellor was visibly pleased, and it was later reported in the minutes that both sides found the remark amusing.

Have German-American relations returned to their former state of normalcy? Schröder and Fischer, at least, would disagree, since they did not in fact abandon any of their prewar positions.

On his flight to New York, the Chancellor declared that he was not traveling to the United States as a supplicant, and on his return flight one of his advisors repeated the sentence that was considered a rallying cry just a few months ago, but now describes little more than a state of affairs: "German foreign policy is determined in Berlin."

It appears that the Americans can live with that. In the lobby of the Waldorf-Astoria, a senior State Department official joked with German Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger: "If you're happy and Condi Rice is happy, then so am I."