It is striking that Brussels and Washington often refer to Iran, Syria, and Sudan in one breath. At first glance one is confronted not with their similarities but with their striking differences. Iran's hectic capital of Tehran is the largest city in the Middle East; its rapid growth has resulted in housing shortages, pollution, and traffic congestion.

Thanks to the geopolitical shifts in the Middle East resulting from the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Iran has become the dominant regional power in the Persian Gulf. Unlike Tehran, Damascus is sedate and proudly exudes old world hospitality. Syria has recently lost much of the regional influence it had acquired

during the 30-year rule of Hafez al-Assad, father of the current president . And then there is Sudan: Anarchic Khartoum looks like the overgrown suburb of a run-down colonial backwater, though one now dotted with signs of new oil wealth. In many respects Sudan is an incomplete state. It may have defused the protracted civil war between its north and south, but it remains a regime enforcing state authority with insufficient and inappropriate means, especially in troubled Darfur.

These countries do not just differ in terms of their level of development or their regional positions, but also in terms of the problems they generate for themselves, their citizens, their regional environment, and the international community. Iran, with its nuclear program, has maneuvered itself into a drawn-out conflict with the international community. Syria is a party to and an indispensable participant in the search for a solution to the Middle East conflict, while it simultaneously has long undermined the stability of its neighbor, Lebanon.

In Darfur the Sudanese government -- together with diverse militia and rebel groups, some supported by neighboring countries -- is waging a war that so far has cost the lives of more than 200,000 people and has led to the displacement of two million. Although none of these three states is democratic, the differences in their political systems are considerable: Syria is an authoritarian system that prohibits all opposition. The Iranian state is authoritarian and theocratic, yet its Islamic-republican constitution allows for more political pluralism and political debate than most Arab states. And Sudan, following the signing of the north-south peace agreement in 2005, finds itself in a process of political transformation, the outcome of which is uncertain.

Nevertheless, there are indeed many similarities: All three states are subject to international sanctions, imposed by combinations of the UN Security Council, the United States, and Europe. There are also similar reactions and patterns of behavior among their ruling elites. And in all three cases European and American policies have so far failed to achieve stated goals.

Also, Iran, Syria, and Sudan all feel pushed into a corner by the West. Europe and the United States are routinely criticized for their lack of understanding of these countries' justified interests. In Tehran, Damascus, and Khartoum, many see the West as unwilling to provide genuine help. The rationale of Western policy is often questioned, not least because of the contradictory signals Western leaders send: Do the United States and Europe pursue certain regional political goals, for example peace in the Middle East, or regional stability? Are they primarily concerned with their own economic, energy, and geopolitical interests? Do they seek political change or punishment? Do they perhaps even want to overthrow the regimes in Khartoum, Damascus, or Tehran? And which of these goals has priority?

Regime Change?

The ruling political elite in the three capitals is largely convinced that ultimately Washington and the Europeans are pursuing regime change. This feeling of being under threat is not conducive to a critical examination of one's own policies. As part of the range of reactions, hardliners and reformers advocate different political options, while policymakers select from different, to some extent contradictory, options. This includes selective cooperation with international organizations when that cooperation impinges on their sovereignty.

Take for example, Iran's dealings with the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) inspectors or Sudan's cooperation with Unamid, the African Union-UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. These countries are willing to accept international efforts to establish peace and stability, actually demanding it at times, but often without adopting a proactive stance. Syria sent a representative to the Middle East Conference in Annapolis in 2007; the Sudanese government has participated, unlike a number of the rebel organizations, in the ongoing internationally mediated peace talks for Darfur; In 2007 Iran held bilateral talks at ambassadors' level with the United States on the situation in Iraq.

At the same time, in all three states an attempt is being made to compensate for poor relations with Europe and America -- and the increasing reticence of Western companies to do business with them -- through "look east" policies.

China in particular, as well as India and Malaysia, are more than willing to fill the position left vacant by Western firms and policies. Ultimately, the elites of all three states feel closer to Europe than to China. However, they are not going to forgo the building of pipelines and refineries or the development of their oil and gas reserves simply because Western firms will not do it. And at the same time that European states impose restraint on their firms, the Chinese government supports its companies involved. It is no surprise then that China's share of the market in these countries is growing while Europe's is declining -- nor is it only a temporary development.

Clearly, only when the major disputes between these states and the international community have been resolved -- or a US government suddenly decides to pursue engagement instead of isolation -- will American companies make inroads into these markets. Furthermore, China's investments, and those of the other Asian states, are clearly of a long-term character. This applies not least to the economically weakest of the three states, Sudan.

Without the support of China, India, and Malaysia, Sudan would not be an oil exporter today. Western commentators are quick to criticize China for providing Sudan with virtually unconditional development aid. However, from the Sudanese perspective the primary focus is on improvements in infrastructure resulting from this development cooperation: road building projects for example, bridges and schools, improvements that benefit the population irrespective of the regime's character.

Up to now, the international policies pursued toward Iran, Syria, and Sudan have failed. The UNSC has now passed five resolutions on the Iranian nuclear program, which Iran continues to ignore. Syria, despite international and even Arab pressure, is still able to block political developments in Lebanon that is deems in conflict with its own interests. An international peacekeeping force is stationed in Darfur and an EU force is in neighboring Chad, even though there is still no peace to enforce.

For Western policies toward these states, three general principles could be useful: differentiating between their legitimate and illegitimate interests; clarifying our own priorities in respect to these states and regions; and solution-based engagement.

Legitimate vs. Illegitimate Interests

Firstly, every state has legitimate interests, even states with highly problematic policies. There are, for example, many Iranians, even members of the political elite who, though concerned about the confrontational stance of the Iranian president and outraged by his comments on Israel and the Holocaust, do not want to see the entire country held ransom over the nuclear program. They tend to close ranks when they feel that the international community is riding roughshod over Iran's justified interests.

Many Iranians, for example, are convinced that the West is withholding progressive technologies from it. The Iranian ruling elite also cannot ignore the fact that it is effectively surrounded by American troops and US allies. Furthermore, Washington has not only branded it part of the "axis of evil," but following the demise of the Soviet Union and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein has declared it Enemy No. 1.

In Syria the Assad regime has clearly failed to come to terms with the loss of Lebanon following the withdrawal of its troops three years ago. Furthermore, the upper echelons of the regime feel threatened by the international tribunal set up to investigate the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

At the same time, Syria has legitimate interest in regaining the Golan Heights (occupied by Israel since 1967) within the framework of a peace agreement. In Damascus there are justified concerns that this issue will be sidelined if the international community successfully negotiates an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement before a negotiated agreement on the Golan is close. Who in Europe or the United States, ask Syrians, will invest energy in resolving the Golan question once the Israeli-Palestinian problem has been resolved?

A discerning analysis of legitimate interests is perhaps hardest of all in Sudan. In Darfur, war crimes have been committed on a vast scale. To only blame the Sudanese government for genocide policies, however, is too simple. The term "genocide" mobilizes moral outrage but it is unsuited for mediation or compromise solutions. Mediation attempts and compromises, however, are exactly what is needed in the case of insurgency and civil war --which best describes the Darfur conflict. The conflict in Darfur is an insurgency originally motivated by demands for the just distribution of material resources, namely water, arable and grazing land, as well as political power.

Observers speak of the first environmental war in the Sahel zone, the grasslands south of the Sahara which are increasingly threatened by desertification. The government itself felt increasingly threatened and has thus pursued a policy of counterinsurgency and has given irregular tribal militias a free hand in their campaign against local opponents. Insurgency and civil war are now linked to regional conflicts and political power struggles in Khartoum: the militias are no longer under the control of the regime; rebel organizations have split into a variety of groupings, and tribal militias now wage war against one another, the civilian population, and even government forces.

There is also an international element as individual rebel organizations in Sudan are being armed by neighboring countries or are themselves active in these countries. The Justice and Equality Movement, for example, presently the strongest of the rebel organizations, has received at least some of its arms from Libya and most recently, in addition to carrying out an armed attack on the Sudanese capital, also lent its support to the Chadian dictator Idriss Déby in that country's domestic conflicts.

Simultaneously, Sudan is implementing a peace agreement between the north and the south. Despite the many mistakes made by the Khartoum regime, it succeeded in ending a war that it inherited from its predecessors and then pursued for a decade and a half -- a war whose roots can be traced back to the refusal of Sudanese governments since the state's founding to accept the multiethnic and multilingual nature of Sudan. The north-south peace agreement signed in 2005 has initiated a change of course by agreeing on a division of power and resources. If successfully implemented (which is still not guaranteed) it will bring about fundamental political change in Khartoum.