Despite the unpleasant things they have said about each other lately, former US President George W. Bush and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder used to get along relatively well. Both men shared a dislike of the formal aspect of politics and liked to loosen things up with brash remarks or little jokes. Once, when someone mentioned the possibility of smoking a cigar with a glass of red wine after an early dinner at the White House, the German chancellor asked the president whether he had Cuban cigars. It was obvious that he didn't, given the fact that the United States imposed an embargo on the socialist island nation almost 50 years ago, but the two macho leaders had themselves a good laugh over Schröder's comment.

That episode took place on Jan. 31, 2002, a date that has taken on near-historic significance after the fact. The former US president argues that the deep rift between the United States and Germany over the campaign against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was created on that day. In his just-published memoirs, Bush mentions the meeting and accuses Schröder of breaking his promise. According to Bush, it was on that day that the German chancellor had promised him that his country would support Bush in a war against Iraq, just as it had in Afghanistan. Bush claims that Schröder distanced himself from that pledge later on, during the next election campaign. Once that trust was violated," he writes, "it was hard to have a constructive relationship."

Not true, says Schröder, who insists that he never made any such commitment to Bush nor broke his word. Indeed, Schröder says, Bush is "not telling the truth" in his memoirs.

In a court of law, it would be Schröder's word against Bush's. But which one of them is right?

Ironically, both men are right and wrong at the same time. They behaved this way because their interests were not compatible. It was only a suspicion at the time, but we know today that in January the Americans were already preparing to enter a war that the Germans viewed with skepticism.

On Jan. 31, 2002, both men were determined to maintain harmony. Bush began the official part of the chancellor's visit to Washington with words of great praise for his guest, who had tied the Germans' participation in Operating Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to a vote of confidence in the German parliament, the Bundestag, and had achieved a majority as a result. Schröder liked the prologue because he valued being treated as an equal among the world's most powerful. He claimed to represent a changed Germany, one that was now willing to take on military responsibility and expected recognition in return. On that day, he received recognition for Germany's involvement in missions in the Balkans and Central Asia.

The Second Phase of the War on Terror

But the United States was already further along. It was heading for a war with Iraq. Two days before Schröder's arrival, Bush had given his famous "axis of evil" speech, which was tantamount to a declaration of war against the regimes in Iran, North Korea and Iraq. The central message was encapsulated in the words: "We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer."

This was a new tone. The second phase of the "war on terror" was beginning, and the golden days of unity after Sept. 11, 2001 were coming to an end. America was determined to replace the regime in Baghdad and bring democracy to the entire Middle East -- the dream of the neocons, right-wing revolutionaries and, most of all, the Pentagon. On Jan. 31, Schröder had the privilege of being the first of the worried Europeans to find out how serious Bush was about his new strategy.

The American president jovially told Schröder that nothing had been decided yet and that the allies would, of course, be consulted before any decisions were made. This mirrors Schröder's description of the meeting in his memoirs, published in 2006. Bush's recollection of the meeting today is very similar to Schröder's account. "I told the German chancellor I was determined to make diplomacy work. I hoped he would help," Bush writes, adding: "I also assured him our words would not be empty. The military option was my last choice, but I would use it if necessary."

Schröder addressed this threat without further ado, but he also stated a critical condition for Germany's participation in a war. If Saddam Hussein was in fact giving safe haven to terrorists, as the Taliban regime in Kabul was, he writes in his memoirs, Germany would support America.

On Jan. 31, both Bush and Schröder pretended that the "axis of evil" speech had not changed the basis of the relationship between their two countries. America was preparing for war, but its reasons for doing so would change in the coming months. In the spring of 2002, the US government was still portraying Saddam as a mentor for al-Qaida. By summer, it claimed that he posed a threat to the United States because of his biological and chemical weapons. In the end, after it had all proved to be lies and deception, Washington argued that liberating the Iraqis from their tyrant was a blessing for the entire world.

Schröder is right in saying that Bush didn't tell the truth on Jan. 31. The president claimed that plans for war were not on the table, yet the military's first draft of war plans were on his desk four weeks earlier. He claimed that he was "determined to make diplomacy work," and yet he had already decided in favor of regime change in Baghdad. He promised to consult with the Europeans before making a decision, but unlike the Europeans, Bush's idea of consulting with his allies did not involve a discussion of the pros and cons of intervention in Iraq. Instead, he was only interested in their answer to a simple question: Are you with us or against us?

Schröder Didn't Tell Whole Truth, Either

But Schröder didn't tell the whole truth, either. It's hard to believe that the chancellor would have received an unconditional majority vote in the Bundestag for a war against Iraq. The vote on a German military contribution in Afghanistan, which was in fact uncontroversial, passed the Bundestag by a slim margin of 336 to 326. Four Green Party politicians had voted against German involvement in the conflict, while nine others made it clear that they were supporting the administration of Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer with great reluctance, and that they would withdraw their support in the event of an invasion of Iraq. Finally, Schröder's success in the election that Fall was partly attributable to his opposition to the looming war.

In January 2002, Bush and Schröder seemed to be speaking at cross purposes. The real issue only flared up briefly once, when Bush said over dinner: "We have to stop them before they do something to us." No one thought to ask what exactly those words meant.

'Axis of Evil' Speech Based on Military Preparations

America had been preparing for a war against Iraq for some time. Bush's closest advisors were already mentioning Saddam's name on Sept. 12, 2001. Between Christmas 2001 and August 2002, the military leadership met with the president more than a dozen times, presenting their scenarios on how the war could proceed. Bush had his doubts and asked for improvements to the military strategy.

The first time he was satisfied with the strategy was in January, he writes in his memoirs. His speech about the Axis of Evil, on Jan. 29, was based on these military preparations.

The president and the chancellor met seven times between 9/11 and May 2002, bilaterally and at international conferences. Bush, hoping to placate his allies, embarked on a European tour on May 22. His first stop was Berlin, where tens of thousands took to the streets to protest against him. The city was in a state of emergency. The German officials in charge of protocol for the Bush visit tried to come up with activities with a human touch. One suggestion was to have the two leaders play soccer or take a boat ride on the Spree River. In the end, they ate currywurst and apple strudel at the Theodor Tucher restaurant next to the Brandenburg Gate.

Bush was restrained and gave an engaging speech at the Bundestag. He met the floor leaders of the major parties with seats in parliament and surprised almost everyone he met by showing a side of his personality they hadn't expected. Schröder and Bush saw each other twice, but their encounters were surprisingly brief. Again, the president said that Washington hadn't made up its mind yet about Iraq. In the second part of his memoirs, to be published in February 2011, then-Foreign Minister Fischer writes:

"The chancellor and the president danced around the precarious subject like two cats around the proverbial hot soup, which is certainly not unusual in talks at the highest levels. The chancellor asked to be involved in the decision, to which Bush replied that there was nothing to be decided on his desk, but that if it came to that he would notify the allies. Schröder wanted to be involved in the decision, while Bush assured him that he would notify him once he had decided. If Gerhard Schröder had given different assurances in Washington, this would have been clear in that conversation in May. However, it was my impression that the chancellor and the president were talking at cross purposes on the issue of Iraq, because both knew that they held opposing positions that could not be reconciled."

Afterwards, interested American parties spread the rumor that Schröder had given his approval of a war under the condition that it would not adversely affect his election campaign. The Germans denied this. Today Dieter Kastrup, the chancellor's foreign policy advisor at the time, says that the election was never mentioned.

Nothing had changed in Berlin. The Americans made a secret of their preparations for the war and were a long way from bringing the Germans into the loop. After the meeting, Chancellor Schröder told the press that he would only "make our decision when, after consultations, a decision is to be made." Before that, he said, he would "not make any speculative statements."

Too Risky to Notify the Europeans

When Condoleezza Rice, the president's national security advisor at the time, was later asked why the United States had proceeded without consulting its allies, she said that she felt that it was too risky to notify the Europeans. They didn't trust Schröder and they certainly didn't trust then French President Jacques Chirac. They only trusted then British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

An open conflict erupted between the Germans and the Americans between May 23 and August 5. "This guy has been cheating me," Bush said to Dan Coats, the US ambassador in Berlin at the time. Schröder could have said the same thing about Bush, but with greater justification.